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The Institutional Structure of
Immigration Law
Eric A. Posnert

INTRODUCTION

In a series of papers, Professor Adam Cox and I argue that
immigration scholars should give more attention to the institutional structure of immigration law, using models and principles
drawn from economic theory.' Most existing scholarship takes
different approaches. A large doctrinal literature attempts to
work out the legal implications of the immigration code and the
cases. 2 Another literature, heavily normative, is oriented to advocacy and is particularly concerned with racism and other
forms of discrimination in immigration law, and the ways in
which immigration law falls short of what authors see as constitutional requirements, international obligations, or moral principles.3 A third literature takes a historical perspective on immigration law but usually focuses like the second literature on the
role of racist and other invidious motives in the evolution of immigration law.4
t Kirkland and Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago Law School.
This Article was prepared for The University of Chicago's Immigration Law and Institutional Design Symposium, held at The University of Chicago Law School on June 15
and 16, 2012. Thanks to the participants in that conference and Adam Cox for comments, and to Ellie Norton and Randy Zack for helpful research assistance. The Russell
Baker Scholarship Fund at The University of Chicago Law School provided financial assistance.
1 See generally Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law,
79 U Chi L Rev 1285 (2012) (arguing that the US federal government extensively delegates immigration authority); Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants:
An Optimal ContractFramework, 84 NYU L Rev 1403 (2009) (discussing the optimal set
of rights for migrants); Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of
Immigration Law, 59 Stan L Rev 809 (2007) (arguing that immigration scholars should
consider the institutional design of the immigration system).
2
See, for example, Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the
Courts: Immigrationand JudicialReview, 78 Tex L Rev 1615, 1616-24 (2000).
3
See, for example, Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution:Immigrants,
Borders, and FundamentalLaw 188-89 (Princeton 1996).
4
See, for example, Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of
Immigration and Citizenship in the United States 8-9, 171-73 (Oxford 2006).
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As a result of these dominant strands in this literature, the
institutional structure of immigration law and its normative
foundations has received less attention than it deserves. By the
institutional structure of immigration law, I mean the rules and
institutions of immigration law, their behavioral effects, and the
connection between these effects and various normative goals
that can plausibly be attributed to immigration policy. So there
is a descriptive question-What effects does immigration law
have on the behavior of migrants and Americans who interact
with them, such as employers? And then there is a normative
question-Do these behavioral effects advance legitimate goals
of public policy?
Of course, the goals of immigration law are heavily contested. Some people believe in open borders; for these people, immigration law can serve no legitimate purpose.5 But there appears
to be a rough consensus in this country that open borders are
not obligatory and that immigration law should permit the migration of people who will make significant contributions to US
social welfare, in particular (1) those who bring important skills
or fill gaps in the labor market, (2) those whose presence would
permit family reunification, while in both cases (3) people who
intend to migrate permanently should share American values
and be capable of integration into society. Let us consider these
goals as roughly legitimate, and take them as given. Numerous
questions of institutional design remain. How should immigration law be structured so as to advance these goals? For example, should the government ensure that these goals are satisfied
for each potential migrant by requiring her to take a test? Or
would it be better to let promising migrants enter the country
and then make permanent residency conditional on satisfactory
behavior over a period of time?
In this Article, I summarize and develop the approach that
Professor Cox and I take to answering these questions, and use
this approach to shed light on recent debates touching on the institutional design of immigration law.
I. THE NORMATIVE GoALs OF IMMIGRATION LAW

As noted above, the normative basis of immigration law is
heavily contested, but a rough consensus can be outlined. Below
5 See, for example, Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 Rev Polit 251, 251-52 (1987).

2013]

Institutional Structure of Immigration Law

291

I describe that consensus, relying on the law itself and what
seems like the basic public and political attitude about the lawwhat people support and what they oppose. The aim here is not
to defend a particular normative agenda, but to provide a fixed
normative baseline, which can be used for understanding the
purposes of different provisions of the immigration code.
A.

The Maximand

The ultimate goal of immigration policy is clearly to maximize some conception of welfare. The major goals of immigration
policy, as I discuss below, are related to improving the wellbeing or wealth of various individuals or firms. Employers seek
skilled workers; households seek nannies and gardeners; Americans seek to be reunited with foreign relatives.
But whose welfare? Should immigration law advance the
welfare of Americans only, or also that of foreigners? The latter
view, which has some support among philosophers, is known as
cosmopolitanism.6 In the policy and legal literature, this view is
manifested in occasional worries that immigration to the United
States will harm people left behind in the migrants' countries,
where brain drain occurs.7 This view ignores the many benefits
for foreigners, including remittances and the circulation of
knowledge that takes place when migrants return to their home
countries, as they often do.8 But whatever its philosophical merits, the cosmopolitan view has virtually no support in American
public policy. Politicians advance the interests of voters, and foreigners do not vote. The normative basis of immigration law is
thus maximization of the well-being of Americans.9
B.

Economic Well-Being

The next question is how can immigration law be used to
maximize the well-being of Americans. A frequent answer to this
6
See, for example, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism:Ethics in a World
of Strangers 171 (Norton 2006).
7
See, for example, id.
8 See, for example, Fernando R. Tes6n, Brain Drain, 45 San Diego L Rev 899, 90001 (2008); Yariv Brauner, Brain Drain Taxation as Development Policy, 55 SLU L J 221,
224, 228 (2010) (arguing that emigration to developed countries may have positive effects for developing countries).
9 There is an interesting question concerning at what point the migrant "enters"
the US social welfare function so that public policy appropriately advances his utility
function directly. A possible answer is when the migrant becomes a citizen, but a more
complete argument is called for. Welfarism does not answer this question directly.
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question is that immigration law should be used to admit highly
skilled workers who cannot be found in the United States or to
fill in gaps in the labor market.1o
A more careful understanding of this goal starts with the
observation that the admission of a migrant has numerous effects, both positive and negative. First, the migrant, whether
highly skilled or not, will expand the labor supply within a particular economic sector. As a result, wages will drop. Employers
(including shareholders) will benefit from lower labor costs, so
will consumers if, as normally occurs, some of the cost savings
result in lower prices. Holding all else equal, American workers
in the same sector will experience lower wages (or, if the sector
is booming, their wages will not rise as quickly as they otherwise would). Second, the migrant, once in the United States, will
consume goods and services, increasing demand, and thus potentially helping American workers who produce goods and services that migrants consume. Third, the migrant will pay taxes
and in this way help finance public goods in the United States.
But fourth, migrants will contribute to congestion-for example,
crowding hospitals and schools. Thus, the empirical effect of migration (both the number of migrants and the types of skills of
the migrants) is a complex question, which cannot be answered
in the abstract.
C.

Family Reunification

A long-standing goal of US immigration law has been family
reunification." This goal advances social welfare in two ways.
First, Americans with close family relations who are abroad are
made better off if those relations are admitted into the United
States as immigrants. In this way, immigration policy addresses
the interests of a subset of the population, those with relations
abroad. Second, one might conjecture that by preferring foreigners with close relations in the United States, the government
ensures that many migrants will receive assistance when they
enter this country and will be in a better position to adjust to a
10 See, for example, Bill Gates, How to Keep America Competitive, Wash Post B7
(Feb 25, 2007).
11 See Ruth Ellen Wasem, U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions ii
(Congressional Research Service Mar 13, 2012), online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/homesecfRL32235.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013); Inna V. Tachkalova, Comment, The
Hardship Waiver of the Two- Year Foreign Residency Requirement under Section 212(e) of
the INA- The Need for a Change, 49 Am U L Rev 549, 572-74 (1999).
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foreign culture than other immigrants are. The American family
relations will likely help the migrant adjust to a new culture by
providing advice in the migrant's native language, shelter, financial assistance, and other benefits. It is possible that the
emphasis on family reunification in US immigration law accounts for the high level of assimilation of immigrants, which
contrasts favorably to the experiences in other countries.12
D.

National Glory, Culture, Diversity, and Investment

Although most of US immigration law is oriented toward
importing workers and family members, a number of more marginal provisions advance other goals as well. The laws give preference to talented athletes, artists, and scholars.' These people
help the United States compete against other countries in the
areas of culture and science, and even national glory, as illustrated by the preferences for Olympic athletes.14 Immigration
law also attempts to ensure that migrants hail from a diverse
group of countries rather than just a few15-possibly reflecting a
theory that diversity is valuable, or a fear that an excessive
number of migrants from a single country or culture may cause
political fragmentation.16
E.

Rights

Much immigration law scholarship focuses on the rights of
migrants, contending that immigration law does not give sufficient respect to their rights. A common complaint is that deportation hearings use summary procedures,18 or that immigration

12 See Jacob L. Vigdor, Comparing Immigrant Assimilation in North America and
Europe *13 (Manhattan Institute Civic Report No 64, May 2011), online at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_64.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013); Kerry Abrams,
Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage,91 Minn L Rev 1625, 1637 (2007).
13 See Immigration Nationality Act (INA) § 203(b)(1)(A), 8 USC § 1153(b)(1)(A) (establishing that visas shall "first be made available in a number not to exceed 28.6 percent" of employment-based immigrant visas per year to aliens with "extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics").
14 See Lindsey M. Baldwin, Note, When a Goon's Goal Is a Green Card: NHL Players and the Alien of ExtraordinaryAbility Immigrant Visa Category, 22 Georgetown Immig L J 715, 730 (2008).
15 See INA § 203(c), 8 USC § 1153(c); INA § 202(a)(1), 8 USC § 1152(a)(1).
16 See Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National
Identity 316-19 (Simon & Schuster 2004).
17
18

See note 3.
See note 3.
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violations are criminalized.19 The literature treats these rights
as exogenous, and thus the normative desirability of various
immigration law provisions stands or falls depending on whether they are consistent with those rights. From the standpoint of
social welfare, however, rights must be endogenous: it must be
shown how they advance social welfare. And from the standpoint of national social welfare, one must explain why giving
rights to aliens advances the interests of Americans. I return to
this point in Part II.C, below.
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
A.

A Useful Analogy and Some Assumptions

Under the approach argued for in this paper, I assume that
the state seeks to achieve the goals described above by attracting migrants. Formally, the state seeks to maximize (national)
social welfare, but to attract migrants, the state must "pay" the
migrants more than their costs from migration. The costs of migration can be high. They include the financial costs of moving
to a new location, but also-of considerable importance-the
psychic costs of leaving family, friends, and relations, and moving to a foreign and unfamiliar country, where the language may
be different, and cultural, religious, and social norms are likely
to be different.
To make migration attractive for migrants, states do not literally pay them, but states must allow migrants to keep enough
of their earnings, and allow them to remain long enough, to cover the fixed costs of migration plus the cost of living. As we will
see, states must thus offer migrants various rights or guarantees so that migrants do not believe that, for example, they will
be deported as soon as an economic downturn occurs in the host
country.
The importance of this point can be seen when one considers
that migrants must normally make country-specific investments.
A country-specific investment is an expenditure of resources,
typically by the migrant, which pays off for the migrant only as
long as the migrant remains in the country in question. A classic
example of a country-specific investment is learning the

19 Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration through Crime, 109 Colum L Rev
Sidebar 135, 147-48 (Dec 12, 2009), online at http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp
-content/uploads/2009/12/135_Chacon.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013).
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language of a country where that country's language is not spoken elsewhere (as is the case for Japan, but not the United
States).20 The migrant to Japan who learns Japanese is unlikely
to be able to earn payoffs if he leaves Japan, except possibly as
an interpreter or translator. Another type of country-specific investment is learning the norms and customs of a country. Migrants also make country-specific investments by establishing
relationships with citizens.
The economic analogy is the firm-specific investment, which
is used in labor economics to describe workers who earn skills
that pay off only in the firm in which they are employed.21 Once
workers make firm-specific investments, they are subject to
holdup by the employer-the employer can underpay the worker
because the worker cannot obtain equal payoffs at other firms.22
As a result, workers will not make firm-specific investments unless they receive contractual or other assurances that they will
remain with the firm or be compensated if they are fired.23 Similarly, migrants will not make country-specific investments if
they believe that they can be easily deported.24
The state can be seen as akin to an employer, and immigration law then can be understood in two ways: (1) as a screening
device for distinguishing desirable migrants and undesirable
migrants, just as employers use screening devices for distinguishing desirable job applicants and undesirable job applicants
and (2) as a method for controlling the behavior of migrants after
they are admitted, just as employers use contracts to control
workers. This useful analogy clarifies the way that immigration
law is, or can be, structured so as to advance its normative
goals. The analogy also draws attention to the crucial assumption of the approach: that the problem for the state is that migrants have private information both about their characteristics
See Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 834 (cited in note 1).
See Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital
Markets and CorporateLaw, 51 U Chi L Rev 1061, 1067 (1984).
22 See Gary S. Becker, Human Capital:A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with
Special Reference to Education41-43 (Chicago 3d ed 1993).
23 See Fischel, 51 U Chi L Rev at 1067 (cited in note 21).
24 It should not be assumed that it is always in the national interest to encourage
country-specific investment. Nations can benefit from short-term or cyclical foreign labor, which supplements the work force during labor shortages without depriving citizens
of jobs during economic slowdowns. For a contrary view, see Cristina M. Rodriguez,
Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of What Immigrants and Americans
Owe One Another, 2007 U Chi Legal F 219, 222 (criticizing guest-worker programs because they block long-term incorporation of foreign workers into the citizenry).
20
21
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and about their behavior. The state needs to elicit that information in order to advance its goals.
In sum, the state receives payoffs from admitting migrants,
and especially migrants who will work and pay taxes. Migrants
receive payoffs from migrating to states where their employment
prospects are superior to those in their home countries. However, migrants will not migrate in the first place, or make countryspecific investments, if they believe that they will be too easily
deported, or subject to abuse. Thus, countries must grant certain
rights to migrants in order to attract them.
B. Methods of Screening
In models used by economists to analyze the hiring process,
the analyst assumes that the employer has limited information
about the "type" of a job applicant. "Good types" are workers
whose preferences and abilities are suitable for the employer.
"Bad types" are other workers.25 It is tempting to assume that
employers can determine the type of a worker simply by reading
his curriculum vitae. And sometimes they can. But usually employers care about more than the formal educational achievements of job applicants; they also care about their enthusiasm,
diligence, creativity, ability to work with others, and other characteristics, of which academic degrees may not be good predictors. Even prior work experience may give employers little information about the abilities of a worker.
Employers address these problems in several ways. They
invest in verifying information that job applicants provide and
in searching for additional information about the applicant.
They give job applicants tests. They interview them. They hire
them on a temporary basis and then give them a permanent position if they demonstrate that they are suitable for the firm. All
of these methods generate information about the job applicant's
type, enabling the employer to avoid hiring people who lack the
appropriate talents.26

25 See generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q J Econ 355 (1973).
See also Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U Chi L Rev
865, 879-80 (2007).
26 See generally Amy Gallo, How to Prevent Hiring Disasters, HBR Blog Network
(Harvard Business Review May 27, 2010), online at http://blogs.hbr.org/hmul2010/05/
how-to-prevent-hiring-disaster.html (visited Mar 3, 2013); Richard Brody, Beyond the
Basic Background Check: Hiring the "Right" Employees, 33 Mgmt Rsrch Rev 210 (2010);
James E. Randall and Cindy H. Randall, A Current Review of Hiring Techniques for
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Immigration authorities face the same problem that employers do. An applicant for entry-temporary or permanentpossesses private information about his or her type. In the context of immigration, the good type of immigrant is the immigrant with two major characteristics: (1) skills that are valuable
for domestic employers and (2) assimilability. Ideally, the immigrant will possess both characteristics, but it would be a mistake
to assume that only high-skilled migrants are considered desirable under US policy. US employers also seek unskilled workers
who will take jobs that Americans refuse to take; given the surfeit of unskilled workers around the world, the goal then is to
choose immigrants who are most readily integrated in society.
The government's strategy is to condition admission on
proof that a potential migrant belongs to the right type. Of
course, a potential immigrant of the wrong type has no incentive
to reveal his type, and indeed will engage in "cheap talk"insisting that he belongs to the good type when he in fact does
not. 27 The government therefore obviously cannot take the potential migrant's word for it. Instead, the government can (for
example) condition a visa on proof that an employer will hire the
migrant and indeed on satisfactory performance for a period of
time. Where the question is not the migrant's skills but his assimilability, the government could condition the visa on proof
that the migrant speaks English, has lived in the United States,
or has other characteristics or experiences that predict assimilability. In addition, the government could admit the migrant conditional on eventual assimilation-which can be measured in
various ways, such as avoiding imprisonment or making friends
and establishing relationships.
There are two basic approaches to screening. Under the ex
ante approach, the government examines information about
characteristics of the potential migrant that exist at the time of
entry: education, language skills, past experience in the United
States, criminal record, and so forth.28 Under the ex post approach, the government permits the migrant to enter on a temporary or conditional basis and then extends the period of the visa
if the migrant shows that he can prosper in the United States-by
obtaining a job, making relationships, joining community
Sales Personnel: The First Step in the Sales Management Process, 9 J Mktg Theory &
Prac 70 (Spring 2001).
27 Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 824 (cited in note 1).
28 See id at 824-25.
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organizations, learning English, and engaging in other actions
that demonstrate assimilability.29 Each approach has characteristic advantages. Under the ex ante approach, the government
avoids taking the risk that a temporarily admitted migrant disappears into the vast underground economy and can also assure
the migrant who possesses the right qualifications that she will
not be ordered to leave in the future, thus encouraging the migrant to make country-specific investments. But the ex ante approach will rarely work well for the vast quantity of unskilled
migrants, who cannot realistically distinguish themselves as assimilable or not on the basis of ex ante information. For them,
the ex post approach is most suitable, as it allows them to prove
their assimilability by prospering while living in the United
States.
C.

Controlling Behavior and the Rights of Migrants

States also seek to control the behavior of migrants after
they enter the country. To understand the problem, imagine
that the screening works perfectly, and so only good types are
admitted. Nonetheless, problems may arise. Even good types
may act in ways that do not advance the state's interest, and if
they do so, the state may be justified in removing them.
The optimal contract framework is helpful here. Imagine
that a migrant enters the United States. The migrant is admitted only because immigration authorities determine that she
fills a gap in the labor market. However, the migrant quits her
job soon after admission, qualifies for public welfare, and commits crimes. This is a problem of moral hazard. To the extent
that the government cannot monitor the migrant and punish or
remove her for failing to perform the actions for which she was
admitted, the migrant may have an incentive to shirk and engage in other actions that may be more profitable for her.
To counter moral hazard, the government can take a number of actions. It can monitor the migrant by, for example, requiring her to make reports about her activities to immigration
authorities, which would verify her reports. It can keep track of
any criminal activity of which she is convicted. In addition, it
must sanction migrants who violate the "contract." Removal
may be an adequate remedy, but it may not be sufficient. If the

29

See id at 826.
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cost to the migrant of removal is not high enough to deter moral
hazard, then criminal sanctions may be warranted.
A more difficult problem arises when a migrant who has not
acted badly may nonetheless lose her value to the state. This
could happen if, for example, an economic downturn takes place,
so that the migrant's labor value diminishes. It could also happen in times of insecurity; migrants from certain countries that
become military enemies may be regarded with suspicion. In
these cases, the government may have an incentive to remove
the migrant.
However, as noted above, the government benefits if migrants make country-specific investments. But migrants will be
reluctant to make country-specific investments if they believe
that they may be removed for any reason or no reason.3 0 Thus, it
is important for the state to commit in advance that it will remove migrants only under specified conditions, including bad
behavior by the migrant, but also-if it is desirable-economic
downturn and war. Migrants will reduce their country-specific
investments relative to an absolute guarantee, but the level will
be optimal given the government's uncertainty about the future.
In this framework, migrants have rights but the rights are
endogenous: Governments grant rights to migrants in pursuit of
the national interest rather than being constrained by exogenous moral or constitutional obligations. Governments should
grant rights to the extent that doing so is necessary to attract
migrants and encourage them to make country-specific investments, but there is no reason to believe that the rights of migrants will be the same as the rights of American citizens. Instead, rights should increase as the migrants' value for the
country increases, especially where it is desirable to encourage
country-specific investment-which is likely to be the case for
skilled workers and not, or less so, for unskilled workers. It will
also make sense to expand the rights of migrants as their residence in the host country lengthens. Due process rights should
be adequate to minimize false positives (where migrants are
mistakenly deported) and false negatives (where migrants are
mistakenly permitted to stay) to the extent that resources are
not better used for other purposes. If migrants are risk averse,
as is likely, then due process rights should be substantial, so as
to minimize the risk of false positives.

30

See id at 829.
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In recent years, controversies have erupted over the criminalization of immigration violations that earlier had been merely civil violations.31 For example, it is now a crime to reenter the
United States after having been removed at an earlier time.32
Many commentators argue that this trend is unfair or selfdefeating.3 The problem is that removing (or repeatedly removing) immigration law violators may not create sufficient deterrence where the border remains relatively porous. Thus, harsher
sanctions may be justified as a method of discouraging excessive
levels of illegal migration. I will return to this topic in Part III.B.
Delegation

D.

An important feature of US immigration law is delegation of
authority to private individuals or nonfederal institutions.34 One
could imagine, for example, a screening system that does not rely on delegation. Applicants for entry submit evidence of their
qualifications to government officials, who evaluate it, and then
grant or deny a visa. However, our system does not work that way.
In the case of employment-related migration, the government delegates in large part to employers. Employers must
sponsor applicants for entry in most cases; in doing so, they signal their support for the applicant to the government and provide evidence that the applicant meets the various criteria for
admission.35 The logical explanation for this approach is that
employers have both better information about the skills of potential migrants and better incentives to distinguish the good
types and the bad types because the good types will contribute
more to their profits.
The problem with delegation is that the agent's interest will
not be perfectly aligned with that of the principal. Employers
want to make profits, not advance national welfare, and so they
31
32

See Chac6n, 109 Colum L Rev Sidebar at 137-39 (cited in note 19).
INA § 276, 8 USC § 1326.
33 See, for example, Barbara A. Frey and X. Kevin Zhao, The Criminalization of
Immigrationand the InternationalNorm of Non-discrimination:Deportation and Detention in U.S. Immigration Law, 29 L & Inequality 279, 312 (2011); Chac6n, 109 Colum L
Rev Sidebar at 147-48 (cited in note 19); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries between Immigration and Crime Control after September 11th, 25 BC Third World L J 81,
122 (2005).
34 See Cox and Posner, 79 U Chi L Rev at 1287-88 (cited in note 1) (describing how
the US federal government delegates to various private and nonfederal actors authority
to admit and manage immigrants).
35 See id at 1306-08.
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will, for example, invest inadequately in screening where they
expect migrants to quit shortly after admission.36 The law partially addresses this problem by making the migrant's continued
presence in the country (roughly) conditional on continued employment with the sponsoring employer.37 But the law does not
address other problems; for example, employers may have little
interest in ensuring that workers are likely to assimilate as long
as they contribute to the bottom line. One can imagine rules
that would improve employers' incentives, for example, by making them financially responsible when sponsored migrants commit crimes or stop work.
The other main area of immigration law is family reunification. One can again start by imagining a system that did not involve delegation. Any applicant for permission to migrate would
submit to the immigration authorities a list of the names of relatives who live in the United States. If the relationships are close
or numerous enough, the application would be approved. But
that is not our system. The US system requires that existing
family members sponsor the migrant, which requires, among
other things, that the family members promise to help the migrant adapt to her new surroundings.38
A clear advantage of such a system is that US residents will
sponsor relatives only (or mainly) when they are confident that
the relatives will succeed as immigrants. Sponsors will seek to
import family members who are industrious and responsible rather than those with propensities toward criminal behavior. In
addition, out of bonds of family loyalty, sponsors are likely to
provide assistance to the migrant, helping her to adjust to a new
workplace and a new environment. The system helps ensure
that migrants will be welcomed and assimilated into existing US
communities.
On the cost side, family reunification obviously limits migration to people who already have family members in the United States who are willing to sponsor them. Many qualified migrants are not so lucky. And sponsors will, as in the case of
employers, follow their own interests rather than those of the
country, sponsoring migrants in some cases who may have criminal proclivities or no desire to work for a living.
See id at 1302-04.
See Kati L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices of Immigration
Law and Labor and Employment Law, 31 Comp Labor L & Pol J 125, 135 (2009).
38 See Cox and Posner, 79 U Chi L Rev at 1316-22 (cited in note 1).
36

37
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Another group of delegates in the US system are the states.
Congress has delegated a range of powers to state governments
that are related to immigration.3> Unlike the case of employers
and families, however, Congress has not given states the power
to choose among potential migrants, at least not explicitly.40 But
Congress has given states a great deal of enforcement power.
Although the limits of these powers are subject to controversy
and litigation, it is clear that states can, for example, report
suspected criminals who offer no proof of US citizenship to the
immigration authorities, who can then take action against
them.41 Many states (and municipalities) aggressively use these
powers, while others do not, reflecting different public attitudes
toward migration.42 In areas where migrants are welcomed,
states and cities do not check for proof of US citizenship even
when offering privileges like driver's licenses.43 In these ways,
states have the power to influence the composition of the immigration communities within their borders and thus collectively
to affect the incentives of people to migrate to the United States
in the first place.
When states seek to achieve immigration goals at variance
with those of the federal government, conflicts arise. In recent
years, the federal government has attempted both to exploit and
constrain the police powers of states in more creative ways. A
number of programs require states to check suspects for immigration status by sending identification data to federal immigration authorities and then to turn over the suspects to federal

See id at 1329-49.
See id at 1333-37.
41 See INA § 287(g)(1), 8 USC § 1357(g)(1).
42 See, for example, States Take Varying Approaches to Immigration and Higher
Education (Chronicle of Higher Education July 25, 2010), online at http://chronicle.com/
article/States-Take-Varying-Approaches/123683 (visited Mar 3, 2013); Juliet P. Stumpf,
States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 NC L Rev
1557, 1596-1600 (2008).
43 See Patrick McGreevy and Anthony York, Gov. Acts on Deportation, License
Bills; Immigration-RelatedMeasures Are among a Raft of Legislative Items That Brown
Considers before a Midnight Deadline, LA Times Al (Oct 8, 2012) (reporting Governor
Jerry Brown signed a bill that "will make illegal immigrants eligible to drive legally in
California if they qualify for a new federal work permit program"); James Barrigan, AB
2189: Bill to Grant UndocumentedImmigrants Right to Apply for Driver'sLicense Passes
California Senate and Assembly, Awaits Governor Signature, Huffington Post (Sept 2,
2012), online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/02/jerry-brown-could-make
-california-first-state-to-license-undocumented-immigrants n_1848268.html (visited Mar
3, 2013) (noting that at least three states grant driver's licenses to undocumented workers while others explicitly refuse to do so).
39
40
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authorities if they are not legally present. 44 In this way, the US
government attempts to take advantage of states' vast police
powers while preventing states from adopting policies toward
immigration contrary to federal law.
III. FIVE APPLICATIONS

A.

The Points System

We can summarize some of the insights discussed so far by
offering a brief set of criticisms of points systems. Under a
points system, the government awards points to an applicant
based on the number and kind of desirable characteristics that
she has.45 An applicant will receive points for, among other
things, advanced degrees that show educational attainment; fluency in the national language; prior experience living in the host
country; relationships with citizens; and related factors that
show the applicant's suitability as a temporary worker or immigrant. Points systems exist in Canada and other countries.46
Many immigration reformers praise points systems because they
seem like a logical way to ensure that immigration serves the
national interest;47 these systems are contrasted to America's
apparently chaotic approach that relies on the uncoordinated efforts of employers and family members.
Yet the points system is not as appealing as it first seems.
First, the points system assumes away the problem of asymmetric information in the screening process.4 8 It is simply assumed
that the government can reliably determine people's qualifications. But the government is not in a good position to determine
whether, say, a degree in electrical engineering from university
X in Cambodia is as good as a degree in electrical engineering
from university Y in Peru. Only employers can reliably determine
44 See Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens 1-3 (Department of Homeland Security July 21, 2009), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foialsecurecommunities/
securecommunitiesstrategicplanO9.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013).
45 Canada created the first such system in 1967. See Chris Gafner and Stephen
Yale-Loehr, Attracting the Best and the Brightest: A Critique of the Current U.S. ImmigrationSystem, 38 Fordham Urban L J 183, 187-88 (2010).
46 See Stephen Yale-Loehr and Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt, A Comparative Look at
Immigration and Human Capital Assessment, 16 Georgetown Immig L J 99, 108-29
(2001) (describing the points-based immigration systems of Canada and Australia).
47 See, for example, id at 131-32 (comparing the US immigration selection policy to
points-based systems and concluding the United States should adopt the latter).
48 See Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 8225 (cited in note 1).
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whether job applicants will serve their needs. And the points system overlooks the benefits from ex post evaluation-where people are admitted on the basis of very general criteria and then
permitted to remain if they obtain jobs, avoid crime, and become
assimilated. Recall also that labor market needs do not always
track educational attainments; the economy may need, say,
nurses rather than doctors. Indeed, in this respect the points
system assumes that the government can determine which sectors of the labor market are in need of replenishment, when in fact
employers are more likely to possess this information.
Second, and related, the points system is particularly inappropriate for a country like the United States, where there is
significant demand for unskilled foreign labor.4@ Points systems
that value educational credentials undervalue unskilled labor; a
points system could be adjusted so that educational attainments
are not given points, but then there would be no way to give preference to highly educated people where their labor is demanded.
Third, the points system ignores the problem of controlling
migrants once they are here. To be fair, proponents of points
systems are not usually focused on this problem. But by the
same token they ignore a vast area of immigration law. Even
people who score well on the points system might decide, once
they obtain admission, not to pursue productive activities and
instead become a public charge or turn to a life of crime. To
counter these incentives, the government must monitor and
sanction migrants, even those who are admitted legally.
Finally, the points system ignores the advantages of delegation. As noted above, the government is not in a strong position
to evaluate applicants for entry and may even be at a disadvantage with respect to enforcement compared to states and
municipalities. Delegation exploits the informational advantages
of private individuals and other governmental entities. By contrast, the points system assumes a top-down approach administered by the national government and thus contains all the disadvantages of that type of approach.5o
49 See Frank D. Bean, et al, Luxury, Necessity, and Anachronistic Workers: Does the
United States Need Unskilled Immigrant Labor?, 56 Am Beh Scientist 1008, 1025-26
(2012).
50 For the advantages of the alternative, delegation, see Gafner and Yale-Loehr, 38
Fordham Urban L J at 188 (cited in note 45); Manjula N. Variyam, Canada's Skilled
Worker Immigration Regulation and Its Impact on the CanadianEconomy, 12 L & Bus
Rev Am 603, 605 (2006) (discussing a 2002 report showing "that the selection criteria for
skilled workers are no longer adequate and are not supported by indicators of immigrants'
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"Crimmigration"

It is common to think of illegal immigration as a public policy failure that results from the government's reluctance to expend adequate resources to enforce the law. But this thinking
begs the question why the government does not expend greater
resources to enforce the law. Professor Cox and I argued that
one can better conceive of an "illegal immigration system" in
which the government consciously encourages or allows migrants to enter the country illegally while retaining the authority to remove them for any reason, with minimal due process. 51
Thus, while the lawful system is characterized by high ex ante
barriers to entry, plus (relatively) strong protections from removal, the illegal system is characterized by (relatively) low ex
ante barriers to entry (for example, overstaying a tourist visa)
and weak protections from removal.52
The case for the illegal immigration system is that immigration policy seeks to meet a large demand for unskilled labor, but
it is very difficult to screen people who lack credentials. For unskilled labor, the biggest concern is that the migrant will be unable to assimilate, but ability to assimilate is not something that
can be observed at the port of entry. Instead, the government allows entry but retains the authority to remove the migrant for
any reason-crime, joblessness, even economic downturn-while
also periodically granting a path to citizenship via amnesty bills
to migrants who satisfy certain criteria-obtain employment,
learn English, and so forth. The courts have implicitly endorsed
this approach by refusing to grant robust due process protections to illegal migrants subject to removal procedures.
In recent years, immigration scholars have drawn attention
to so-called crimmigration, which for present purposes I will define as the increasing use of criminal law and criminal law enforcement against illegal migrants.63 Starting in the 1980s,

integration into Canadian society" and that "predicting occupational shortages over the
lifetime of an immigrant in his twenties or thirties was not possible").
51
Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 813-14 (cited in note 1).
52 Both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have pursued a policy of
cracking down on illegal immigrants who commit crimes, while generally leaving alone
those who do not. Compare Julia Preston, Immigration Agency Arrests 3,168 in Six-Day
Sweep across U.S., NY Times All (Apr 2, 2012), with Julia Preston and John H. Cushman
Jr, Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., NY Times Al (June 12, 2012).
53 See, for example, David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 New Crim L Rev 157, 158-60 (2012); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting
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Congress has criminalized a number of acts that traditionally
were civil immigration violations and has enhanced penalties for
criminal immigration violations; the executive branch has significantly increased resources devoted to criminal immigration enforcement.54 Immigration law scholars have deplored this trend
on several grounds, namely, that in practice migrants are given
summary procedures that inadequately protect their rights, and
that their incentives to assimilate will be weakened if they are
faced with arbitrary procedures or the criminalization of the
very acts that lead to assimilation (including the criminalization
of various forms of "harboring" where Americans lend aid to illegal migrants).55
However, there are several good reasons for this trend.
First, as noted, prosecution for criminal violations may contribute to screening of low-skill migrants who otherwise do not possess visible differentiating characteristics that the state could
use to distinguish the good migrants from the bad. Immigration
policy seeks people who will assimilate; all things equal, participation in criminal activity signals a personality type that is unlikely to assimilate. To be sure, one might object that the current system is excessively crude.56 It makes the judgment of a
migrant's potential for assimilation turn on a single criminal act
rather than on consideration of all relevant factors, such as the
length of time that the migrant has resided in the country,
whether he has learned the language, whether he is normally
employed, and so forth. A more flexible system may be called for.
Second, criminalization of immigration violations will generally enhance deterrence by subjecting violators to more serious
punishments. At the same time, the involvement of criminal
process helps prevent wrongful conviction.
Third, deportation may be a cheap and effective way of deterring people from committing serious crimes that are not immigration related. Deportation is cheaper than a long period of
imprisonment; thus, holding constant the magnitude of the

Immigration, 104 Nw U L Rev 1281, 1286-91 (2010); Chac6n, 109 Colum L Rev Sidebar
at 135-37 (cited in note 19).
54 See Chac6n, 109 Colum L Rev Sidebar at 137-38 (cited in note 19).
55 See, for example, Eisha Jain, Immigration Enforcement and HarboringDoctrine,
24 Georgetown Immig L J 147, 152-54 (2010).
56 See, for example, Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: CrimmigrationLaw and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L Rev 1705, 1709 (2011) (arguing that focusing on the single criminal moment is superficial because an individual is a collection of many moments and
experiences).
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sanction, the government can reduce its costs by giving a convicted criminal a short prison term and then deporting him rather than by giving him a long prison term (assuming reentry
can be prevented).57
Some commentators object to deportation on the ground
that it is akin to exile of US citizens, which is unconstitutional,
at least when migrants have sufficient contact with the United
States so as to entitle them to membership in this country.5 8
However, the constitutional prohibition on exile does not apply
to noncitizens, and there is no particular reason to extend it to
noncitizens. There may well be cases where deportation would
impose an unacceptable hardship on the migrant-for example,
where the migrant has resided in the United States since she
was a child and does not speak the language of or have any contacts with the country in which she was born. Thus, one might
support limitations on deportation where deportation would be
inhumane. But it would be wrong to conclude that deportation is
inhumane in the more routine case where the migrant has substantial contacts with her home country. 9 By contrast, exile of a
US citizen will normally cause great hardship because (in the
absence of special circumstances like dual citizenship) that person will have no right to citizenship in a foreign country, and so
could end up stateless.
There are other problems with deportation as a criminal
sanction. It will be ineffective if the violator can simply reenter
the country. And it may result in the export of criminals to countries with weaker criminal justice systems where they may

57 Compare Immigration Enforcement Fiscal Overview: Where Are We, and Where
at
2011), online
Feb
(National Immigration Forum
Going? 1
Are We
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/2011/ImmigrationEnforcementOverview.
pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013) (claiming the US government spends $7,500 for every apprehension at the border and $23,000 per deportation), with Christian Henrichson and Ruth
Delaney, The Price of Prisons: What IncarcerationCosts Taxpayers 10 (Vera Institute of
http://www.vera.org/download?file=
at
online
20,
2012),
July
Justice
(visited Mar 3,
3542/Price%2520of%/2520Prisonsupdated%2520version_072512.pdf
2013) (finding the average cost to incarcerate an inmate to be $31,286 per year).
58 See, for example, Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-ImmigrationConvergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 Am Crim L Rev 105, 132-35 (2012).
59 In one of the few proposals by an immigration scholar to use the threat of removal to address crime problems, Professor Eleanor Brown creatively argues that people in a
terrorist's network who fail to inform on him would be deprived of their visas or access to
visas. See Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, A Visa to "Snitch": An Addendum to Cox and
Posner, 87 Notre Dame L Rev 973, 982-83 (2012).
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continue to wreak havoc.60 Thus, in certain conditions a country
may properly refrain from deporting criminals as a form of international cooperation or development aid.
C.

Labor and Employment Law

As Professor Keith Cunningham-Parmeter notes, it was
traditionally assumed that illegal workers and lawful workers
had the same rights in the workplace-including the rights to
form unions and to be free of discrimination (except to the extent
that employers may fire a worker or refuse to hire him on the
basis of illegal status).61 But in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc

v NLRB,62 the Supreme Court held that illegal workers could not
recover damages for certain labor law violations that were
available to lawful workers, and since then other cases have
suggested ways in which the rights of illegal and lawful workers
diverge under both labor law and employment law.63
Professor Cunningham-Parmeter fears that this trend will
isolate illegal workers, to the detriment of themselves and to the
immigrant community.64 Yet there are strong reasons for denying rights to illegal migrants that are granted to citizens and
lawful permanent residents. Some context is useful here. Illegal
migrants have no right to work at all-just as many lawful foreign residents may enter the country on a visa but lack the right
to work. Thus, it is not obvious that it is unfair that if they work
illegally, then they lack some of the rights that lawful workers
possess.

Existing law reflects a judgment that rights can be used to
lure desirable workers to this country and to reward them in
stages as they prove themselves fit subjects for citizenship.
Thus, people who enter lawfully after proving their credentials
receive more rights than people who enter illegally;65 people who
have obtained a green card receive more rights than people who
merely have visas.66 If this scheme serves legitimate public policy
60 See Robert J. Lopez, Rich Connell, and Chris Kraul, MS-13: An International
Franchise,LA Times Al (Oct 30, 2005).
61 Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers,
58 Am UL Rev 1361, 1367-68 (2009).
62 535 US 137 (2002).
63 Id at 140 (denying an illegal immigrant backpay awarded by the NLRB). See also
Cunningham-Parmeter, 58 Am U L Rev at 1366-71 (cited in note 61).
64 Cunningham-Parmeter, 58 Am U L Rev at 1401-14 (cited in note 61).
65 See Cox and Posner, 84 NYU L Rev at 1405 (cited in note 1).
66 See id at 1406.
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objectives,67 then Professor Cunningham-Parmeter's proposal
that illegal workers be given the same rights as legal workers
would undermine those objectives.
In a related article, Professor Stephen Lee argues that employers may use immigration laws to ensure the removal of
workers who draw attention to workplace violations.68 Under the
law, employers are not supposed to hire illegal migrants; if they
do so anyway, they may be subject to sanctions. But in practice,
the government relies on employers to screen out illegal workers, and so when employers report illegal workers to the government, the government gratefully detains them rather than
questioning the employer's motives.69
Professor Lee, like Professor Cunningham-Parmeter, emphasizes ugly aspects of a system that limits the rights of migrants for policy reasons.70 He further emphasizes that delegation of screening power to employers allows them to subject
foreign workers to harsh working conditions, which may also
deprive US workers of employment because employers must give
US workers better working conditions.71 The problem is the result of agency costs: employers do not share the government's interests in excluding foreign workers, and still less the government's interest in workplace safety. Delegation to employers
thus inevitably leads to perverse outcomes unless the government modifies employers' incentives.
But it is not clear that the solution is to give illegally present foreign workers the same rights as US workers. Conferring
employment and labor rights on illegal workers would have the
following effects, some of them offsetting. First, the US labor
market would become more attractive to foreign workers to the
extent that they value these rights, and thus their incentive to
migrate illegally would increase, exacerbating the problem of illegal immigration. Second, however, employers would find foreign workers less attractive because the cost of employing them
would rise. The second effect would probably predominate over
the first, because if foreign workers valued the rights more than
the wage offset, then employers would probably give those rights
See id at 1408.
Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 Stan L Rev
1103, 1103-07 (2009).
69 Id at 1128, 1137.
7o Id at 1134.
71 Id at 1107.
67
68
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to them voluntarily. Third, conferring those rights on foreign
workers may benefit US workers-for example, by encouraging
whistle-blowing or facilitating unionization-but this would be
another reason why employers would be more reluctant to hire
foreign workers if required to give them US rights. Thus, the
overall effect of granting labor and employment rights to foreign
illegal workers would likely be to reduce the demand for their
labor, which would harm them as well as US consumers who
benefit from their work. Such an approach would be in tension
with the traditional illegal immigration system, which provides
work and potentially a path to citizenship to unskilled foreign
workers with no attachment to this country.
Screening of Low-Skilled Workers

D.

Professor Cox and I argued that what we call the "illegal
immigration system" in the United States may be due in part to
the difficulty of screening low-skilled workers plus constitutional
constraints on removal of legal immigrants.72 Suppose that a
country demands low-skilled labor. The world presents an ample
supply of such workers, but they will look largely identical to the
country's government. Selection cannot be based on educational
credentials because most low-skilled workers have none beyond
perhaps primary education; in addition, educational credentials
may have little relevance to the work. What the government
seeks are people who work hard, who obey the law, and-where
the demand is for temporary workers rather than permanent
migrants-who will return to their country when their labor is
no longer needed. All of these characteristics are unobservable,
and formal proxies-for example, the absence of a criminal record, the presence of an employment history, and so forth-may
be unreliable.
We argue that to address this problem US policy has been to
look the other way and permit workers to enter the country illegally, while retaining the authority to remove them if they are
caught committing crimes or seeking public welfare, or even if
the demand for labor declines.7 Because the workers are present
in the country illegally rather than on visas, constitutional protections are minimal, and so deportation can be accomplished
cheaply, using summary procedures. Meanwhile, workers who
72
73

Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 843-47, 851-52 (cited in note 1).
See id at 845-47.
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stay in the country for a long time, prosper, assimilate, and
avoid criminal activity may eventually be given a path to citizenship through discretionary legislation.
In an interesting paper, Professor Eleanor Brown describes
a program in Canada that overcomes the problems with ex ante
screening of unskilled or low-skill agricultural workers.74 Canada and Jamaica have entered into an arrangement under which
Canada "outsources" to Jamaica the task of screening Jamaicans
who apply for visas to work temporarily in Canada. Canada provides Jamaica with some minimal criteria for entryemphasizing health, strength, farming experience, and lack of a
criminal record.75 Crucially, because Jamaica benefits from permitting its citizens to work in Canada (in part through remittances), the Jamaican government has strong incentives to
screen out people who do not meet Canada's criteria and who
plan to overstay the visa and work illegally. Jamaica, in turn,
has selected people on the basis of (1) strong ties to the country
(such as participation in a family farm); (2) reports from informal community records indicating that the applicant has avoided criminal activity (formal police reports are unreliable); and
(3) residence in rural communities, which tend to be more tightknit than urban communities.76 Jamaica also educates workers
accepted into the program about the penalties for violating the
rules and the consequences for communities that rely on it."
Jamaican officials are even permitted to enter Canadian territory to monitor and provide aid to workers.78
As Professor Brown explains, in this system Canada overcomes both screening and control problems by delegating some
of the administration of the program to Jamaica.79 Jamaica has
better information about the "types" of applicants than Canada
does, and Jamaica has means of disciplining violators that Canada lacks-which includes appealing to their sense of honor and
patriotism, and their concerns for the well-being of compatriots
who would be harmed if the program were shut down.80 The
74 Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compliance, 77 Fordham L Rev 2475, 2489-2501 (2009).
75 Id at 2499.
76 Id at 2499-2500.
77 Id at 2501.
78 Brown, 77 Fordham L Rev at 2499 (cited in note 74).
79
Id at 2499-2500.
so Id at 2513-15. In this paper and another paper, Professor Brown creatively explores the way that countries can exploit local social networks, which gives them
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delegation of authority to an agent always raises concerns about
the incentives of the agent, but here Canada is in a good position
to evaluate Jamaica's efforts-simply by counting up the number of workers who go AWOL from the program and receiving
reports from employers about the quality of work. Canada can
credibly threaten to shut down the program if Jamaica fails to
screen properly, and in turn Jamaica has apparently put a great
deal of creativity into developing effective screening procedures.
E.

Bonding

Another issue Professor Cox and I addressed was the problem of ensuring that migrants or foreign workers comply with
the conditions of entry.8 ' Temporary foreign workers, for example, must promise that they will work, comply with the law, and
exit the country when their visas expire.82 A major problem with
low-skilled workers is that they may enter the country lawfully
but then overstay their visas and remain in the country and
work illegally. Some countries require foreign workers to post a
bond when they enter the country; they forfeit this bond if they
violate the terms of entry.83 Professor Brown has advocated a
similar system for the United States.84
The approach has some obvious merits. Under current law,
workers have little to lose by overstaying their visa. They are
unlikely to be caught and deported; even if they are, the penalties are usually light. Part of the problem is the cost of tracking
down illegal workers and then processing them through the immigration system.85 By contrast, a bonding mechanism works
virtually automatically. For example, the mechanism could be
set up so that the worker recovers the bond when she returns to
her home country and provides proof to the American embassy
that she no longer resides in the United States. The embassy
advantages in obtaining information about and controlling the behavior of migrants. See
id at 2513-15; Brown, 87 Notre Dame L Rev at 982-83 (cited in note 59).
81 Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 817 (cited in note 1).
82 See INA § 241(a)(6), 8 USC § 1231(a)(6) (allowing for detention of aliens who are
determined to be a "risk to the community"); INA § 222(g), 8 USC § 1202(g) (allowing for
deportation of an immigrant who overstays his visa). See also Cox and Posner, 79 U Chi
L Rev at 1307-08 (cited in note 1).
83 See Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Visa as Property, Visa as Collateral, 64
Vand L Rev 1047, 1050 n 7 (2011).
84 Id at 1051-52.
85
See Immigration Enforcement Fiscal Overview: Where Are We, and Where Are We
Going? at 7 (cited in note 57) (claiming the US government spends "more than $5 billion
a year to track down, detain, and deport [illegal] immigrants").
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could check to see if the migrant has a US criminal record; if
not, it will return the bond to her.
The major problem with this approach is that most unskilled workers will not have enough money to post a bond.
Thus, a bond requirement could significantly reduce the supply
of unskilled labor to the United States and also do little to relieve the pressure of illegal immigration. Professor Brown suggests that workers may be able to borrow money for the bond
from local banks. The bond would be returned by the US government to the bank when the migrant's visa expires and the
migrant has returned to her home country. 86 The problem with
this proposal is that banks will not usually lend money to poor
people, especially in countries where it is difficult to bring lawsuits to enforce debts. Banks would demand collateral and in
most cases the worker will not be able to supply it. Maybe in
some cases, workers will be able to use the family farm or other
property of family members or relatives as collateral, but again
only a limited group of people would have this capacity. Thus,
while the bonding proposal makes sense from a theoretical perspective, its practical value is probably limited.
CONCLUSION
My goal has been to show that economic models shed light
on important issues of immigration law and institutional design.
My proposals and comments are meant to be suggestive, not
conclusive. There are many avenues for further research, including the development of more sophisticated economic models that
capture more dimensions of immigration-related behavior and
analysis of the many areas of immigration law that have so far
escaped sustained attention.

86

Brown, 64 Vand L Rev at 1071-72 (cited in note 83).

